AL-QAIDA, IRAN, AND HIZBALLAH

A Continuing Symbiosis

Yehudit Barsky
AL-QA`IDA, IRAN, AND HIZBALLAH:
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YEHUDIT BARSKY

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Yehudit Barsky is the director of the Division on Middle East and International Terrorism of the American Jewish Committee and an associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She holds an M.A. in International Relations and Near Eastern Studies from New York University and is the author of a forthcoming book on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as numerous monographs. Ms. Barsky’s publications for the American Jewish Committee include Hizballah, The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, Hamas—the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, `Usama bin Ladin and Al-Qa`ida, and The Brooklyn Bridge Shooting: An Independent Review and Analysis.

Cover photo: Hizballah militants saluting, 2003

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**Foreword**

Color-coded terrorist threat level warnings make headlines and raise blood pressures. Behind them lie complex, little-understood networks of individuals and organizations bent on destroying what they see as their common enemy, the “Great Satan.” Yehudit Barsky’s current terrorism briefing clarifies the relationships among Al-Qa‘ida, Hizballah, and Iran—a development we must monitor vigilantly if we are to understand what we face.

Despite the religious and ideological differences between them, Sunni Muslim terror organizations associated with Al-Qa‘ida and Shi‘i extremists associated with Hizballah, as well as with Iran’s Islamic regime, share a common hatred for the West and a desire to wage war against it. Their ties go back to contacts made in the late 1980s and early 1990s between Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hizballah on the one hand and the Sunni Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiya, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, on the other.

In the late 1980s, young Arab men from around the world came to train in jihad camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in order to fight in the Afghan war. At the end of the war, these mujahideen (“holy warriors”) or Arab Afghan veterans fled Pakistan to a variety of safe havens, including locations in the West. The Islamist regime in Sudan provided asylum to these Arab Afghans. Iran assisted Sudan by building terrorist training camps, out of which came many of the operatives of the various groups that now comprise Al-Qa‘ida.

The instructors in Sudan included members of an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Al-Quds Force. Other Al-Quds officers have trained operatives from Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in camps inside Iran since the 1980s. In the mid-
1990s, when the leadership of Al-Qa`ida returned from Sudan to Afghanistan, attempts were made to formalize ties between `Usama bin Laden and the Iranians.

Following the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Al-Qa`ida leadership was again on the run. The second-in-command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, used his contacts with the Al-Quds Force to find a safe haven for his organization's top brass in Iran. At present four senior leaders of Al-Qa`ida are thought to be sheltered in Iran. Hizballah, too, has been helpful to Al-Qa`ida operatives fleeing Afghanistan; some twenty Al-Qa`ida members are reported being hosted by Hizballah in a suburb of Beirut.

Iran, Hizballah, and Al-Qa`ida share a greater confluence of interests than the religious differences that divide them. All three target the West, Christians, and Jews as their enemies in what they view as an apocalyptic struggle.

Understanding the complex relationships between Islamist radical groups and their sponsor nations requires the depth of knowledge and intelligence-gathering capacity that has been the hallmark of the American Jewish Committee's Division on Middle East and International Terrorism (DMEIT). Established in 1999, DMEIT, the only department of its kind in the Jewish organizational world, focuses on disseminating “open-source intelligence.” The department, under the direction of Yehudit Barsky, evaluates and interprets vast amounts of data to produce in-depth studies such as the present report.

Al-Qa`ida, Iran, and Hizballah: A Continuing Symbiosis is the fifth in a series of terrorism briefings; the previous ones focused on `Usama bin Laden and Al-Qa`ida, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. Together they provide the background needed to understand the ties and the distinctions between the groups that threaten to destroy our way of life.

David A. Harris
Executive Director
The American Jewish Committee
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In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate
To those champions who avowed the truth day and night
... And wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases....

The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates ..., Platonic ideals ..., nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been
by pen and gun
by word and bullet
by tongue and teeth.

We, the sons of Hizballah’s nation in Lebanon, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide by the orders of the single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme example of Ayatollah Khomeini. From this basis, we in Lebanon are not a closed organizational structural party, nor are we a narrow political framework, but we are a Nation interconnecting with all Muslims of the world. We are linked by a strong ideological and political connection—Islam.

From here what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines or anywhere else verily afflicts the body of our own Islamic nation of which we are an inseparable part, and moved to confront on the basis of our main legal obligation in light of the political view decided by our leader, Wilayat al Faqi [the Supreme Jurisconsult, the Ayatollah Khomeini].

One of the major developments following the September 11 attacks has been an increasing symbiosis between Middle Eastern terror organizations that previously had been divided by sharp ideological differences. This relationship has been most evident in the growing ties and cooperation between Al-Qa`ida and Hizballah and has become particularly enhanced over the past two years by Iran's providing safe haven for leaders and members of Al-Qa`ida.

Al-Qa`ida Presence in Iran

Four senior leaders of Al-Qa`ida are presently believed to be in Iran: Sa`ad bin Ladin, the son of the Al-Qa`ida leader; its security chief, Sayf Al-Adil, also known as Muhammed Ibrahim Makawi; the organization's spokesman, Sulayman Abu Ghayth; and Mahfuz `Uld Walid, who heads a committee within Al-Qa`ida that issues fatwas or Islamic theological rulings. Al-Qa`ida employs these rulings to justify the organization's terror attacks. Walid is also known by the nom de guerre of “Abu Hafs the Mauritanian.” Members of Al-Qa`ida who are currently in Iran are believed to be living in Zahedan, the capital city of the Sistan-Baluchistan province in the eastern part of the country.

Sayf Al-Adil currently serves as Al-Qa`ida's “military leader” for the remnants of Al-Qa`ida that still maintain a presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. He was trained by Hizballah and is believed to be the nexus between Al-Qa`ida and Hizballah.

Another Al-Qa`ida leader, training commander Abu Muhammad Al-Masri, also known as Abdallah Ahmad Abdallah, reportedly left Afghanistan with Iranian assistance and went to Lebanon. There he took control of `Usbat Al-Ansar, a group of Al-Qa`ida veterans and supporters operating at the `Ayn Al-Hilweh refugee camp in Lebanon. Al-Masri was reportedly killed there in a car bomb explosion in March 2003.

Following the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, an Al-Qa`ida operative named Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, also known as Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah, reportedly relocated to Iran from a terrorist training camp located in western Afghanistan. Al-Zarqawi
is believed to be Al-Qa`ida's specialist in chemical and biological terrorism. Shadi Abdallah, a former bodyguard of `Usama bin Ladin, testified in a German court in 2002 that Al-Zarqawi had operated a cell in Germany called Al-Tawhid that would send $40,000 each month to Al-Zarqawi in Iran. The deputy leader of Al-Tawhid, known as “Abu Harun,” had arrived in Iran prior to Al-Zarqawi and was already living there when Al-Zarqawi joined him. In May 2003, Al-Zarqawi reportedly departed Iran for Iraq. Al-Zarqawi is presently believed to be in Iraq, organizing attacks against U.S. troops via an Iraqi Al-Qa`ida affiliate, Ansar Al-Islam.

Iran officially confirmed in July 2003 that members of Al-Qa`ida were in that country, and in August its government made an official announcement that “a large number of small and big elements of Al-Qa`ida” continue to be present in that country. Iran's government spokesman, Abdallah Ramezanzadeh, has declared that it will not extradite any members of the Al-Qa`ida leadership to the U.S.: “We hand over Al-Qa`ida operatives who belong to friendly countries or countries that we have signed extradition treaties [with]. We don't have an extradition treaty with the United States.” Iran has also been viewed as an alternative transit point for Al-Qa`ida operatives who have sought to go to Afghanistan without passing through Pakistan.

A Shared Enemy: the United States

On an ideological level, Al-Qa`ida, a Sunni Islamist terror organization, shares a similar worldview with the Shi`i terror organization Hizballah. These terrorist movements are united in their perception of the United States as being the “enemy” of the Muslim world, and each has targeted the U.S. The Shi`i extremists represented by Iran's Islamist radical regime and Hizballah, the terror organization that it created, initiated terror attacks against American targets in the early 1980s. Al-Qa`ida has targeted the U.S. starting from the early 1990s through the present.

The present relationship is the culmination of early contacts that developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s between Shi`i and Sunni
radicals represented on the one hand by Iran and Hizballah, and on
the other by the Sunni radical founders of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya,
the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), and Al-Jihad, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement (EIJ). In 1988, `Usama bin Ladin, a Saudi Sunni radical, established Al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan, together with the leaders of the Egyptian organizations. Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of the EIJ, and Rifa`i Ahmad Taha Musa, the leader of EIG, ultimately became the core leadership of Al-Qa`ida, Arabic for “the Base.”

In February 1998, Al-Qa`ida publicly announced the formation of an umbrella organization that encompassed a coalition of Sunni Muslim terror organizations known as the “International Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders” (Al-Jihad Al-Islamiya Al-`Alamiya liqital Al-Yahud wa Al-Salibiyeen). In its initial declaration to the world, the Front pledged to wage jihad, or holy war, against Western targets, particularly those representing the United States. Signatories of the declaration included the leadership of Al-Qa`ida and a number of other organizations: `Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman Al-Zawahiri of the EIJ, Rifa`i Ahmad Taha of the EIG, Shaykh Mir Hamza of the Jama`at Ulama Pakistan, the Pakistani Clerics Association, and Shaykh Fazl Al-Rahman, leader of Harakat Al-Jihad, the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.21

The leadership of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group reportedly made initial contact with Iran's Pasdaran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, during the late 1980s.22 Al-Qa`ida's followers included young Arab men from all over the world who had come during the 1980s to train at jihad camps in Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghan border and other areas located in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. From there, they made their way to fight in the Afghan war. These young Arab veterans of the Afghan war were called “Arab Afghans,” or mujahideen (Arabic for “holy warriors”). Many remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the war to become followers of `Usama bin Ladin.

Hamid Reza Zakeri, a senior Iranian intelligence official who recently defected to the West, described the early contacts between
the intelligence branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Al-Qa`ida and other Sunni terror organizations:

The relations of the Guards' intelligence organ, not the government, with Al-Qa`ida and other fundamentalist groups like the Egyptian and Palestinian Jihad go back to the 1980s. Following the assassination of [late Egyptian] President Anwar al-Sadat, some Egyptians who were involved in the crime came to us and the Guards' intelligence organ [and] established ties with them. We then went to Lebanon, where we became acquainted with many non-Shiite revolutionary elements.23

Refuge for the Arab Afghans

Following the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, U.S. investigators linked the attack to veterans of the Afghan war, particularly to the bomb-making expert Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, who spent 1987-90 training at jihad camps run by Dr. Al-Zawahiri.24 At the time of his arrest, Yusuf was staying at a guesthouse for Afghan war veterans run by Bin Ladin and was carrying Bin Ladin's address in his wallet.25 Yusuf was later convicted of the attack and sentenced to life imprisonment in the U.S. in January 1998.26 As part of that investigation, American and Egyptian investigators were dispatched to Pakistan in April 1993 to gather information about the Arab Afghans. Subsequently, many of the veterans began to flee Pakistan to seek safe havens elsewhere, including Western countries.

During the early 1990s, the Iranian government offered to provide asylum for the Arab Afghans at training camps in Sudan, which had become a Sunni radical Muslim state in 1989. The groundwork for the Iranian offer to the Arab Afghans was laid in 1991, when Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani forged an ongoing alliance between Iran and Sudan by making an official visit to Khartoum in December 1991.27 Iran was reported to have spent between $10 million and $20 million in Sudan to establish terrorist training bases operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards that would train the Sudanese as well other operatives, who would export Khomeini's Islamic revolution throughout Africa.28
In 1993, the Iranian ambassador to Sudan, Majid Kamal, was ordered by his government to prepare to receive hundreds of the Afghan war veterans in Sudan, including operatives of the smaller organizations that presently comprise Al-Qa`ida. During his tenure as the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon in the early 1980s, Kamal played an active role in the creation of the Hizballah terror organization in Lebanon. From 1994-96, the Sudanese provided a safe haven for `Ussama bin Ladin and the Al-Qa`ida leadership itself.

**A School for Terror**

Iran continued to maintain its presence in Sudan by providing arms, instructors, and finances to train the Afghan war veterans at the camps. The instructors included members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as members of the Guard's elite special operations unit, the Al-Quds Force—“Jerusalem Force.” Members of the Al-Quds Force reportedly receive training in psychological and guerrilla warfare, with an emphasis on terror operations that focus on the use of hand grenades, mines, construction of booby traps, techniques for carrying out ambushes, and the use of camouflage. The Al-Quds Force has provided training to terrorists that includes the use of explosives, carrying out assassinations and kidnappings, as well as methods of torture. The assassinations of a number of exiled Iranian opposition leaders in Europe during the early 1990s have been linked by Western investigators to the Al-Quds Force and the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

The Al-Quds Force is based in Tehran and has reportedly trained operatives from terror organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad at its Imam Ali camp. The Al-Quds Force is currently commanded by Qassam Sulaymani. During the mid-1990s, when Al-Qa`ida was based in Sudan, Ayman Al-Zawahiri developed an alliance with the commander of the Al-Quds Force at that time, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi. Throughout the past decade, Al-Zawahiri reportedly became a frequent visitor to Iran as a guest of Vahidi and `Ali Fallahian, the Iranian minister of intelligence and security. Another leader of Al-Qa`ida who main-
tained ties to the Al-Quds Forces was the late Abu Muhammad Al-
Masri, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who was considered
to be the fifth most influential leader of Al-Qa`ida.\(^43\) Al-Masri, who
had been responsible for all of Al-Qa`ida's training camps in
Afghanistan,\(^44\) apparently used his ties to the Al-Quds Force to
escape from Afghanistan with Iranian assistance in 2001.\(^45\)

An attempt to formalize direct ties between `Usama Bin Ladin
and the Iranians took place in 1996, after the leadership of Al-Qa`ida
returned from Sudan to Afghanistan. According to American intelli-
gence sources, Al-Qa`ida initially made direct contact with the Irani-
ans in December 1995, when an Egyptian operative of Al-Qa`ida,
Mustafa Hamid, visited Iran.\(^46\) Subsequently, Sa`id Abdallah Nuri,
the leader of Tajikistan's militant Islamic Renaissance Party and a
trusted ally of Bin Ladin, sought out Iranian intelligence agents in
Afghanistan to see if they would join forces with Al-Qa`ida to attack
U.S. targets. Nuri requested that the Iranians contact Bin Ladin, who
was at that time in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. In reply, the Iranian intel-
ligence agents expressed a desire to meet Bin Ladin personally, but
insisted that he should meet them in the Afghan city of Taliqan. Nuri
explained that Bin Ladin was hesitant to go to Taliqan because it was
an area where he could come under attack. Despite these contacts,
the reports did not indicate whether a formal meeting took place at
that time.\(^47\)

**Expanding Ties between Iran and Al-Qa`ida**

In recent years, Iran's ties and assistance to Al-Qa`ida have been more
pronounced. In December 2001, during the U.S. war against Al-
Qa`ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qa`ida's second-in-com-
mand, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, as well as others in the organization's
leadership found themselves trapped in the mountains of Tora Bora
on the Afghan border. Al-Zawahiri reportedly used his contacts with
Ahmad Vahidi of Iran's Revolutionary Guards' Al-Quds Force to
negotiate a safe haven in Iran for some of the organization's leader-
ship.\(^48\)
In early 2002, reports indicated that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon were acting in a reprise of their role in the 1980s in Sudan by organizing the transfer of Al-Qa`ida operatives into Lebanon and Syria. A year after the September 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies detected the existence of a suspected Al-Qa`ida terrorist training camp along the border of a remote area in eastern Iran. Aerial imagery of the camp indicated that it was equipped with an obstacle course and a firing range that was similar to the facilities used by Al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan to train its operatives to carry out assassinations.

In October of 2003, Al-Qa`ida operatives were reported to be crossing over the border from Iran into Iraq. The October 30 suicide bombing attacks in Baghdad against the headquarters of the International Red Cross and four Iraqi police stations are believed to have been carried out by Al-Qa`ida operatives that had, until now, been sheltered by Iran.

The Hizballah-Al-Qa`ida Connection

While Hizballah and Al-Qa`ida part ways ideologically over each movement’s vision of a future Islamic radical state that will eventually encompass the entire globe, the two groups have nevertheless found common cause and have cooperated with one another over the past decade. In the early 1990s, Hizballah’s Foreign Operations Department chief, `Imad Mughniyah, was reported to have been in contact and cooperated with `Usama bin Ladin. Mughniyah is considered responsible for the Hizballah suicide bombing attacks against U.S. diplomats and peacekeeping forces in Beirut, Lebanon, including the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the September 1984 bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex, as well as the October 1984 suicide bombing against U.S. peacekeeping forces stationed at the U.S. Marine Barracks.

`Ali Muhammad, a former U.S. Green Beret who pleaded guilty to conspiring with Al-Qa`ida to bomb the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, admitted in a statement to a New York court that he was a member of the Al-Qa`ida organization. He described Al-
Qa`ida’s activities and contacts with Hizballah and Iran in testimony that was presented to a U.S. court in October of 2000. Muhammad testified:

I was aware of certain contacts between [the] Al-Qa`ida and Al-Jihad organization[s], on one side, and Iran and Hizballah on the other side. I arranged security for [a] meeting in the Sudan between [`Imad] Mughniyah, Hizballah’s chief, and Bin Ladin. Hizballah provided explosives training for Al-Qa`ida and Al-Jihad. Iran also used Hizballah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.53

Prior to September 11, 2001, Mughniyah was reported to have received a request for assistance from Al-Qa`ida’s Al-Zawahiri, which he relayed to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, but the request was declined. Hamid Reza Zakeri, the former senior Iranian intelligence official, further detailed the relationship between Bin Ladin’s deputy, Al-Zawahiri, Mughniyah of Hizballah, and Iranian intelligence in a February 2003 interview.

Nurizadeh [interviewer]: Did you know beforehand about the plan to attack the World Trade Center in New York?

Zakeri: No. But there were in our headquarters models of the two towers, the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA building in Langley. In addition to that, `Imad Mughniyah came to Iran and met some senior officials in the guide’s security organ and brought them a message from Dr. Al-Zawahiri saying [that] we need your help to carry out an extremely serious operation in the Great Satan’s country. The request was discussed but was turned down. The head of our department and Nateq-Nuri, head of inspection in the guide’s office and his representative in the higher security committee, decided to ask Mughniyah to maintain his ties with Al-Zawahiri and his colleagues, but without involving himself in their activities.54

Post-September 11

Since September 11, 2001, `Imad Mughniyah is believed to have been instrumental in having “organized the escape of dozens of Al-
Qa’ida elements to Iran” after leaving Afghanistan. In early 2002 Hizballah was reported to have assisted between twenty and fifty senior members of the Al-Qa’ida leadership who had recently arrived in Lebanon. Approximately twenty Al-Qa’ida members were reportedly being hosted by Hizballah in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. By June 2003, some 200 members of Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban were reported to be residing in the Emergency Street quarter of ‘Ayn Al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon.

In this effort, Hizballah has been assisted by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Hassan Mahdawi, the present commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, is reported to be responsible for the absorption of the Al-Qa’ida operatives.

A growing indication of the cooperation between Hizballah and Al-Qa’ida was the late March 2002 meeting in Lebanon that included the leaders of Al-Qa’ida and Hizballah, as well as the Palestinian terror organization Hamas. Similarly, shortly following the U.S. war in Afghanistan, a senior Al-Qa’ida operative of Yemeni origin known as Salah Hajir arrived in Beirut, Lebanon, during the week of January 14, 2002, and was observed by Western officials to be meeting with members of Hizballah. Since then, both Al-Qa’ida and Hizballah have maintained their ties and have reportedly communicated on “logistical matters.”

Conclusion

While Hizballah, its state sponsor, Iran, and Al-Qa’ida have had ideological differences in the past, the current situation, as they interpret it, warrants a different approach. Iran’s assistance to the Afghan war veterans of the 1980s and again in recent years to members of Al-Qa’ida demonstrates its ability and willingness to assist its ideological competitors within the Muslim world. From the Iranians’ perspective, their assistance to Al-Qa’ida serves their ultimate vision of a Muslim world that will, in time, defeat the United States and its allies and create a global Islamic state.

Iran, Hizballah, and Al-Qa’ida have shared a confluence of interests based on what each perceives as the current threat of their collec-
tive enemies. As a Sunni terror movement, Al-Qa`ida has its own vision of a radical Islamic state that will be created in the aftermath of what it perceives to be an unfolding apocalyptic war between Muslim believers and their enemies, which include Christians, Jews, and the Western world. Coming from the perspective of Shi`i radicals, Hizballah and the current regime in Iran have their own vision of a Shi`i Islamic radical state for the aftermath of that conflict. Both Sunni and Shi`i radicals have realized the benefit of acting in an alliance of interests during the course of what they interpret as an unfolding war currently being waged against them by the West.

For the time being, their conflicting visions concerning the ultimate goal of their respective ideologies—a future global Islamic radical state—are not as important as defeating the West. Therefore, Iran's Shi`i radical leadership and Hizballah can find a common cause and symbiosis with the Sunni terror operatives of Al-Qa`ida.

Notes

1. Al Qa`ida Training Manual, United States Department of Justice website, p. 4. The manual was recovered by UK metropolitan police from a search of an Al-Qa`ida member's home and was presented as evidence at the New York trial of four of the U.S. embassy bombers in 2001. The four were convicted and sentenced to life in prison in October 2001. See http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.

16. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
43. “Some of the Senior Al-Qa`ida Operatives,” op.cit.
45. “Al-Qa`ida Fighters Set up Base,” op.cit.
47. Ibid.


53. United States of America v. Ali Muhammad, United States District Court Southern District of New York, S (7) about 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), New York, NY, October 20, 2000; p. 28, 9-16.


59. Ibid.

60. “Al-Qa`ida Fighters Set up Base in Lebanese Refugee Camp,” op. cit.

61. “U.S. Must Halt Al-Qa`ida Getaway,” op. cit.

62. “Terrorist Groups Join Forces at Lebanon Summit to Plot Further Terrorist Acts against America,” Good Morning America, May 21, 2002; broadcast at 7:00 A.M. ET.

